Saudi Arabia’s one viable export corridor is coming under renewed pressure. After the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed in late February 2026, the kingdom redirected virtually all crude exports to Yanbu on the Red Sea, reaching 98.6% concentration by June. That corridor, currently Saudi Arabia's only viable large-scale crude export route, now faces a declared Houthi naval blockade targeting Saudi-linked shipping through Bab al-Mandeb. The pattern mirrors the escalation cycle described in VesselTracker’s earlier analysis (“Red Sea, the Houthi and Expanded Leverage”): a regional security threat amplified by compounding chokepoint constraints until it becomes a structural supply risk. Gulf crude exports have fallen 82% from 18.8 million b/d in January to 3.4 million b/d in June. Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar are at zero. The UAE maintains a diminished position (0.56 million b/d in June, down from 3.88 million b/d in January) under what appears to be a selective passage regime through Hormuz. Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu flows, which peaked at 4.07 million b/d in March, have eroded to 2.39 million b/d by June, a 41% decline even without Red Sea interference. The critical monitoring question is now whether Bab al-Mandeb remains navigable for Saudi crude tankers. If the Houthi blockade is enforced with the same operational consistency the group demonstrated against commercial shipping in 2024 and 2025, the last functioning Gulf crude export corridor could effectively close. No pipeline bypass, no alternative routing, and no strategic reserve release replaces 2.4 million b/d of Saudi crude plus the refined eastboud product flows.
In January 2026, the Middle East Gulf exported approximately 18.8 million b/d of crude across 370 completed liftings, according to Wood Mackenzie’s MEC tracking (OFF status only, FLD excluded). By June, that figure had fallen to approximately 3.4 million b/d across 71 cargoes, an 82% decline in volume that reflects not a single disruption but the compounding effect of two chokepoint closures operating simultaneously.
The Strait of Hormuz carried approximately 11.4 million b/d of crude capacity in January and February, averaging 6.3 large crude carrier movements per day according to Wood Mackenzie's VesselTracker. On 28 February, following the US-Israel strikes on Iran, traffic ceased. By early July, the strait had partially reopened, but at structurally diminished levels: daily movements averaged 4.4 vessels per day, down 30% from pre-conflict levels, transit vessels down 97% and freight rates approximately three times pre-conflict norms.
Saudi Arabia’s response was immediate. The kingdom shifted virtually all crude exports to Yanbu on the Red Sea via the East-West Petroline. In March, 86.7% of Saudi liftings originated from Yanbu (121.9 million barrels across 77 cargoes). By April that concentration reached 93.6%, by May 94.3%, and by June 98.6%, with only a single Ju’aymah cargo (approximately 1 million barrels) clearing the Gulf. Saudi exports through Yanbu reached approximately 4.07 million b/d in March, declining steadily to 2.39 million b/d by June, a 41% erosion from the immediate post-conflict peak and a 66% decline from January’s total Saudi exports of 7.09 million b/d (MEG) plus 0.87 million b/d (Red Sea).
The destination profile for Saudi Red Sea crude in June and July reveals where these barrels are reaching: 11 cargoes to Ain Sukhna (Egypt, for pipeline onward movement), 5 to Malacca (Singapore Strait distribution), 4 to Karachi, 3 each to New Mangalore and Sikka (India), and 2 each to Ulsan and Yeosu (South Korea) and Yokkaichi (Japan). South Asia and East Asia absorb the majority, with no direct European crude deliveries visible.
The other Gulf producers tell a starker story. Iraq exported 3.77 million b/d in January (80 cargoes). By March that fell to 0.16 million b/d (3 cargoes), by April to 0.06 million b/d (1 cargo), and by June to zero. Kuwait moved from 1.19 million b/d (26 cargoes) in January to 0.01 million b/d in March and zero from April onwards. Qatar, which exported 0.72 million b/d in January, recorded zero from April. These producers have no pipeline bypass to the Red Sea and remain entirely dependent on Hormuz for seaborne access.
The UAE presents the only partial exception. Combined UAE exports ran at approximately 3.88 million b/d in January (94 cargoes). By March this fell to approximately 1.72 million b/d (33 cargoes). Unlike Iraq and Kuwait, UAE maintained some export flow through the conflict period: approximately 1.93 million b/d in April, 1.79 million b/d in May, and 0.56 million b/d in June. In the June-July period, UAE accounted for 68.6% of all non-Saudi Gulf exports (23.4 million barrels, 18 cargoes), with Oman at 22.8% (7.8 million barrels, 4 cargoes) and Iraq at 8.6% (2.9 million barrels, 2 cargoes). Kuwait and Qatar recorded zero.
The UAE’s disproportionate ability to maintain exports, when Iraq and Kuwait have been at zero for months, raises structural questions about corridor access. Abu Dhabi terminals at Jebel Dhanna and Das Island serve tankers that transit Hormuz southbound. The persistence of UAE flows, however diminished, suggests the possibility of a selective passage regime under which certain flag states and charterers secure transit approval. Discharge destinations from UAE in June and July point primarily to South Asia: 5 cargoes to Karachi, 3 to Singapore, with single cargoes to New Mangalore, Mumbai, Yeosu, Vietnam and Myanmar.
Wood Mackenzie’s EWP tracking (20 July 2026) confirms that refined products continue to flow from the region. In June and July, 171 MEG-origin product cargoes were recorded: 88 completed (OFF), 41 en route (OUT), 19 loading (IN), and 15 on confirmed fixtures (FXD). Yanbu and Sohar dominate the loading profile. Cargoes include jet fuel to Pembroke (UK) and Le Havre (France), ULSD to Constantza (Romania), Dar es Salaam and Lome (Africa), naphtha to Daesan (South Korea) and Japan, and gasoline to Aqaba (Jordan) and Vasilikos (Cyprus). Notably, 4 product cargoes loaded at Jubail (Saudi MEG coast) in early July, suggesting limited commercial passage for smaller tankers where VLCCs cannot yet operate.
Absorption comes at a cost
The numbers describe a system operating at a fraction of its former capacity. Total Gulf crude exports in June (approximately 3.4 million b/d) represent 18% of the January baseline (18.8 million b/d). Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu pivot has sustained volume but at declining scale: from 4.07 million b/d in March to 2.39 million b/d in June. The Houthi naval blockade announcement targeting Saudi-linked shipping through Bab al-Mandeb now threatens the only corridor Saudi Arabia has successfully used to bypass Hormuz. A producer that redirected 98.6% of its crude exports to a single Red Sea outlet now faces the prospect of that outlet being contested.
Resilience with limits
Two chokepoints now define Gulf export risk. Hormuz remains commercially constrained: crude VLCC movements in early July averaged 4.4 vessels per day, down from 6.3 before the conflict, with Suezmax structurally absent and transit traffic down 97%. The Red Sea corridor, through which Saudi Arabia routes virtually all remaining crude, faces a declared Houthi blockade that, if enforced, could reduce global oil supply considerably. Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar have no exports. UAE maintains a diminished but non-zero position. The question is whether the selective passage regime governing Hormuz can expand to restore volume for producers currently at zero, or whether the dual-chokepoint constraint becomes the structural baseline for Gulf energy flows.
Sources
1. Wood Mackenzie MEC tracking
2. Wood Mackenzie VesselTracker, vessel movement analysis, January to July 2026
3. Wood Mackenzie Global Refined Waterborne Products tracking
4. “Red Sea, the Houthi and Expanded Leverage”, VesselTracker post.
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