DALI

General information

Course/Position

Latest news

Hours before Key Bridge allision, blackouts were discussed by captain

Eight hours before the 'Dali' allided with the Francis Scott Key Bridge, the master Chandrashekar Sabhapathy spoke with its chief engineer. while the vessel, was berthed at the Port of Baltimore on March 25, 2024. It had just experienced two blackouts, and the captain wanted the engineer to comprehensively complete an incident report for the ship’s office. “For now, put the data reporting date as the28,” the captain told the engineer, which was was three days after the incident. Filing a written report days after an incident is permitted; the U.S. Coast Guard allows five days for a ship to report a marine casualty. The Department of Justice alleged in its lawsuit in 2024 that the 'Dali' did not notify the Coast Guard immediately after addressing the safety concerns, violating federal regulations. Reporting the in-port blackouts could have prompted a Coast Guard inspection. The Coast Guard was conducting a thorough review of all events preceding the allisiion. Some experts said that the crew acted appropriately by creating a comprehensive report that it would later file. Others saud that evidence shoed that an important safety step was skipped prior to the departure from Baltimore. The recently released NTSB documents shed light on the previous afternoon, 10 hours prior to the accident, when the ship twice lost power at the Seagirt Marine Terminal. Alarms sounded intermittently for more than 30 minutes beginning at 2:20 p.m. “Something is missing,” one crew member said in Hindi. “Look there — close to that,” another said. At one point, the alarms ceased, and it was quiet enough for a recording to pick up the sound of a utensil stirring coffee in a ceramic cup. Then, the sirens picked back up. At 5:49 p.m. the master instructed the chief engineer to fill out an “incident report,” and that he wanted the engineer to do so because the “incident was related to the engine room", stressing that he wanted that information as soon as possible but the report itself could be submitted at a later date. The 'Dali' left Baltimore on MArch 26 at around 12:30 a.m. and lost power again four minutes before crashing into the Key Bridge. A dozen members of the crew remained in the Baltimore area, while the federal investigations continued. Chandrashekar Sabhapathy was deposed by the federal government on Feb. 17 at the Baltimore Marriott Waterfront.

Transcript reveals moments of terror, panic and uncertainty aboard the 'Dali

A transcript reveals moments of terror, panic and uncertainty aboard the 'Dali' before and after it allided with the Francis Scott Key Bridge. The transcript of audio recordings is part of the National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation into the aaident and shows that most of the conversations on board the 'DaliÄ were mundane prior to the ship losing power. The conversations included talks about the ship’s journey and even a coffee order. Early in the morning of March 26, 2024, it was business as usual. As the ship was still alongside Seagirt Marine Terminal, the ship's crew on the bridge was "having casual conversation." Around midnight, the 'Dali' began departure preparations. Pilots boarded the vessel at approximately 00:05 a.m., and standard checks were conducted: draft verification, engine blow-through, tug arrangements, and telegraph tests. Two tugs, the 'Eric McAllister' and 'Bridget McAllister', were positioned forward and aft respectively. At 00:16:02, the pilot asked the Master, “Captain, everything’s working?” to which the Master replied, “Yeah, everything is in order.” That reassurance came despite the earlier alarms and incident report request just hours before. The conversation between the Pilot and the Training pilot was ordinary. They were talking about where the training pilot lived and when they started the job. The Pilot mentioned he had stepped on a staple at home. There was conversation about people wanting sugar in coffee. At 00:34:26 a.m., the pilot told the training pilot that the voyage was “pretty straightforward” and remarked that the Portable Pilot Unit (PPU) “really makes it a lot easier,” especially for wider ships. At around 1:25 a.m. the vessel’s power cut off about 0.6 miles from the Key Bridge. At exactly 1:25:03, a.m. the ship’s alarms sounded. The 2nd Officer attempted to call the engine room, but received no response. At 01:28:16, a.m. he reported a critical loss: “We do not have bow thruster.” According to the transcript, the pilot asked the 2nd officer on board: “Do we have steering?” The second officer replied: “We have steering.” But the alarms kept going off and began to change in tone. The Training Pilot then said, "uh oh." Over the next minute, there was chaos on the cargo ship as crew members and the Pilots worked to respond to the loss of power. At 1:26:01 a.m., the Training Pilot said, "Security call. Security call. Container ship Dali has lost power. Approaching the Key Bridge - I repeat - the container ship Dali has lost all power approaching the Key Bridge - Dali." At around 1:27 a.m., the pilot shouted for the crew to use the “bow thrusters.” While the crew tried, at 1:28:56 a.m., the second officer shouted, “It’s not working.” Shortly after 01:27:00, the pilots issued calls for tug assistance and to drop anchor, and the bridge was ordered closed to traffic. Tragically, six road workers remained on the span. The 'Dali' struck the bridge’s pier 17 at 01:29:10, a.m. collapsing six bridge spans. The audio recording picked up an "enormous rumble, when the Dali hit the Key Bridge. The training pilot radioed the Coast Guard at 01:29:37, stating, “Coast Guard. Coast Guard. This is Dali. We have a major problem. The Key Bridge is down. I repeat, the Key Bridge is down.”The transcript notes all the crew members began shouting expletives before the pilot yelled, “Call the Coast Guard.” At 1:29:37 a.m., the training pilot on board the 'Dali' radioed a message, saying: “We have a major problem. The Key Bridge is down. I repeat, the Key Bridge is down." The post-collision recording captured confusion on the bridge amid blaring alarms in the minutes that followed. The Coast Guard inquired about the vessel’s position; the plot responded that they were “under the Francis Scott Key Bridge. The crew and pilots discussed the potential for casualties on the bridge and damage to the vessel. At one point, the Master was heard stating over the phone that water was running into the vessel and containers had broken loose, but that there was “no oil sheen” visible. The final alarm ceased at 02:25 a.m. In the minutes after the bridge collapsed, the pilots on the ship were trying to figure out what went wrong. "I called [the pilot dispatcher] when we started to drift," the pilot said. "But we had good speed," he added. "We weren't going crazy... everything was under control." As for the crew members on board the 'Dali', some — including the ship’s captain and other officers — remain in Baltimore as legal cases progress.

Chesapeake Bay Bridge fails to meet allision standards, risk assessment In response to Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse shows

In response to the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore after the allision of the 'Dali' on March 26, 2024,, the Maryland Transportation Authority (MDTA) has revealed that the William Preston Lane Jr. Memorial Bay Bridge (aka the Chesapeake Bay Bridge) does not meet current vessel collision risk standards, prompting the development of comprehensive safety measures in the frame of the of MDTA’s response to the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) interim accident report and urgent safety recommendations. The NTSB report found that the Key Bridge had a risk level nearly 30 times above the acceptable threshold for critical bridges. Despite the Bay Bridge’s compliance with its federal permit and annual inspections confirming safe conditions for over 30 years, MDTA voluntarily initiated a $160 million project in spring 2024 to evaluate bridge protection. The authority has already invested more than $175 million in bridge safety and security infrastructure over the past decade. The MDTA engaged Moffatt & Nichol (M&N), a leading firm in vessel allision design of bridges, to conduct the risk assessment. The firm’s staff includes the principal author of the AASHTO vessel allision requirements and previously taught Federal Highway Administration courses on vessel collision analysis. The assessment evaluated both the eastbound and westbound spans of the Bay Bridge, constructed in 1952 and 1973 respectively, using the most current AASHTO Bridge Design Specifications and Guide Specifications for an allision. In response, MDTA was developing both immediate and long-term risk reduction strategies. Short-term measures may include new communication protocols for vessel pilots, reduced vessel speeds, one-way transits, and enhanced traffic management. Long-term solutions could involve physical protection measures such as dolphins and pier fenders. The timing of these safety measures coincided with the MDTA’s ongoing study of potentially replacing the existing Bay Bridge spans. The authority has confirmed it will ensure current safety improvements don’t interfere with future replacement plans. The evaluation was part of a broader national safety initiative following the Key Bridge collapse. The NTSB identified 68 other bridges nationwide frequented by ocean-going vessels that were constructed before the 1991 AASHTO guidance and have not undergone recent vulnerability assessments. The MDTA will coordinate its risk reduction measures with the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ensuring alignment with the interdisciplinary team approach recommended by the NTSB.