Allgemeine Informationen

IMO:
9286877
MMSI:
356844000
Rufzeichen:
HPYT
Breite:
35.0 m
Länge:
229.0 m
DWT:
Gross Tonnage:
TEU:
Liquid Capacity:
Baujahr:
Klasse:
AIS Typ:
Cargo Ship
Ship type:
Flagge:
Panama
Hersteller:
Eigner:
Operator:
Versicherer:

Kurs/Position

Position:
AIS Status :
Moving
Kurs:
87.1° / 0.0
Kompasskurs:
84.0° / 0.0
Geschwindigkeit:
Max. Geschwindigkeit:
Status:
moving
Gebiet:
Philippine Sea
Zuletzt empfangen::
2024-04-09
vor 13 Tagen
 
Source:
T-AIS
Zielort:
ETA:
Summer draft:
Current draft:
Letztes Update:
vor 13 Tagen 
Source:
T-AIS
Berechnete ETA:

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Die letzten Häfen

Port
Arrival
Departure
Duration
2024-04-06
2024-04-09
3d 6h 12m
2024-04-02
2024-04-04
2d 2h 23m
2024-02-23
2024-02-29
6d 6h 6m
2023-12-30
2024-01-24
25d 1h 42m
2023-11-27
2023-11-30
2d 23h 56m
2023-11-20
2023-11-23
2d 1h 5m
2023-11-10
2023-11-19
9d 19h 6m
2023-11-01
2023-11-04
3d 5h 45m
2023-09-25
2023-09-30
4d 13h 28m
2023-08-24
2023-08-29
4d 18h 30m
Hinweis: Alle Zeiten in UTC

Die letzten Wegpunkte

Waypoints
Time
Direction
Kukup Island
2024-03-18
Abfahren
Malacca Straits - Port Klang
2024-03-17
Abfahren
Malacca Straits - Penang Island
2024-03-17
Abfahren
Malacca Straits - Penang Island
2024-02-02
Ankommen
Malacca Straits - Port Klang
2024-02-02
Ankommen
Kukup Island
2024-02-01
Ankommen
Sizilien
2023-05-11
Abfahren
Hinweis: Alle Zeiten in UTC

Die neuesten Nachrichten

Report sais that ship officer was poorly trained before accident

Fri Apr 27 21:56:42 CEST 2012 Timsen

Australia’s Transport Safety Bureau found that an injured third officer aboard the "Universal Gloria" was so poorly trained that he was unaware of the difference between oxygen and air. The officer, on his first assignment as third, was badly burned when the air compressor he was using to fill a cylinder for an oxygen breathing apparatus, OBA, set, exploded. During routine checks the third officer found that the pressure in one of the OBA cylinders in the fire locker was about 7 MPa, well below the normal 20 MPa, so he decided to remove the cylinder and take it to the steering compartment so he could use the compressor to re-fill it. The third mate tried to screw the compressor discharge hose connector into the OBA cylinder, but it did not fit. He found an adaptor in the box next to the compressor that fitted both the OBA cylinder and the compressor discharge hose connector. He fitted the adaptor to the hose connector and then fitted it to the OBA cylinder. The third mate checked all the connections and opened the OBA cylinder valve. Then, as he reached over the compressor to switch it on, the compressor discharge tube exploded. During this process, it is likely that the temperature of the oxygen-rich environment within the discharge hose and tube had dramatically increased due to adiabatic compression. The heat of the oxygen rose beyond the auto-ignition temperature of the oil in the system, resulting in the explosion. The third officer was engulfed in a ball of flame. He jumped to his feet, regained his composure, and ran out of the steering compartment. The AB reported the fire, which continued to burn on and around the compressor, to the bridge watchkeeper. He then went to the engine room to get a portable fire extinguisher. He quickly returned with an extinguisher and discharged its contents onto the fire, extinguishing it. The third mate did not understand that the pale green colour of the BA cylinders signified that they were filled with air, or that the compressor would re-fill them with air. Furthermore, he did not understand that air is a mixture of 78% nitrogen, 21% oxygen and other trace gases. In fact, he thought that oxygen and air were the same thing. The ATSB investigation found that the explosion occurred as a result of a fire that started within the compressor when oil ignited in the hot oxygen-rich environment. The investigation identified three safety issues. The crew were not appropriately trained or drilled in the operation and maintenance of the ship’s OBA sets; the ship’s safety management system did not provide the crew with appropriate guidance in relation to the operation and maintenance of the OBA sets; and there were no engineering controls in place to prevent the inadvertent connection of an OBA cylinder to the air compressor. Fortunately, the "Universal Gloria" had not suffered a serious fire: The ship’s fire fighting manual referred exclusively to fire fighting in the vehicle decks of a car carrier and, hence, was of little assistance to the crew on board a woodchip carrier.

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