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On Aprl 15, nearly 70 people, including families, colleagues of the fishermen and leaders of the Coronel area, boarded the Navy vessel "Janequeo" to travel to the area where the "Bruma" sank and bid farewell to the seven fishermen who have been missing since March 30. This followed the Navy's decision on April 14 to suspend the search for the seven fishermen after 17 days. They are the skipper José Luis Medel Sepúlveda, José Luis Medel González, his son Juan Jorge Muñoz Balladares, José Fernando Carrasco González, Julio Eduardo Gallardo Díaz, Carlos Hugo Escárate Ramírez and Jonathan Daniel Torres Saldaña. At the site, near the bay of Santa María Island, an ecumenical ceremony was being held aboard the "Janequeo" to bid farewell to the missing fishermen. to pay tribute of reverence and respect to them. The Biobío Prosecutor's Office is leading the investigation targeting the Blumar's "Cobra" and its crew as responsible for the accident. The Executive Branch has also filed a complaint for homicide. Meanwhile, the fishermen's families also filed a complaint for the same crime, in addition to the failure to provide assistance against the captain of the "Cobra". In response to the incident, the crew of the 'Cobra' publsihed a public statement, stated that they were "deeply saddened by the loss of our colleagues, because we are only now in a position to do so. We had not been able to express our pain before.” The crew members acknowledged that they felt stigmatized after the sinking of the 'Bruma', noting that “several of us cannot go out into the streets because we are being pointed at not only as protagonists of the accident, but also as responsible for this tragedy. For us, life is the most valuable thing. Not only ours, but everyone's, especially that of hardworking people like us, with whom we share a profession we love.” Along with this, they reiterated that "we are actively cooperating with the investigation and trust that the causes of this unfortunate accident will be clearly established." Therefore, "we ask for respect for ourselves and, above all, for our families" until the cause of the 'Bruma' sinking is determined.

On April 17 at 7.30 a.m. UTC the 'Eventin' weighed anchor and was taken in tow by the tug 'Fairplay 83' (IMO: 9883637), and the 'Fairplay XVII' (IMO: 9808247), which both had been deployed from Swinoujscie, serving as steering tug, and shifted to the dangerous goods anchorage off Mukran. The convoy was escorted by the police launch 'Stoltera' (MMSI:211222830) during this manoever.

On April 16, 2025, at 3 p.m. a fire broke out on a vehicle deck of the 'Delphine', which had arrived from Immingham on April 15 and was moored at the Britannia Dock in the port of Zeebrugge. There were 110 electrical cars on board. Firefighters were attending in large contingents. Everyone on board was safely evacuated, there were no injuries. The captain of the ship remained on board to monitor the situation together with the fire brigade and emergency services. The fire was brought under control. Besides the fire brigade, four tugs were also deployed to fight the fire and cool down the ship's hull at starboard side. The internal fire fighting system was activated. By cutting off the oxygen supply with carbon dioxide, the fire was brought under control. The fire brigade was now looking at how to tackle the fire further. There was a risk that the fire might flare up again when the hatches are opened. It was also not yet clear how extensive the damage is. The hold is pitch black due to the large amount of smoke. There was a lot of smoke from the electric cars, which also made the extinguishing work more difficult.The fire had no major consequences for the operation of the rest of the port. The ships can still sail in and out, a ship that was at the LNG terminal had to wait because of the perimeter. Report with photo: https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2025/04/16/brand-cargoschip-zeebrugge/?fbclid=IwY2xjawJsukpleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHkXXEm991fWYvFkGT82yNG3f2l3C3_KoYBSUpmK08mIF06cgsQM4eP6jIfko_aem_Ctw36kMssSfI_sSFUneKdQ https://focus-wtv.be/nieuws/brand-op-russisch-cargoschip-in-haven-zeebrugge-brandweer-nog-volop-aan-het-blussen

On April 14, 2025, at 5.40 p.m. the 'ALphenaar', enroute from Rotterdam to Moerdijk with a cargo of containers, allided with the Algera Bridge, linking Krimpenerwaard and Capelleupon the IJssel, in Krimpen upon the IJssel. The damage was limited. One container on deck was dented, and the bridge construction suffered paint damage. The ship was able to moor again unassisted. The police have investigated and recorded a statement from the master, who, as he approached the bridge, began to doubt whether there would be enough clearance. ‘He then put the engine in full reverse, causing the bow to rise slightly, so that one container just hit the bridge. If the skipper had done nothing, he would have passed the bridge without any problems.’ The margins for the ship are small on the route to Alphen aan den Rijn. The 'Alphenaar' previously had alllided with the Algera Bridge in 2022. Traffic over the bridge between Krimpen and Capelle aan den IJssel was not affected by the accident, but shipping traffic was disrupted until the incident had been investigated. Report with photo: https://capelle.ijsselenlekstreek.nl/112/112/422272/binnenvaartschip-vaart-tegen-algerabrug-schade-valt-mee

An interim factfinding report on the allision of the' Maersk Shekou' at Fremantle on Aug 22, 2024, which was published on April 17, 2025, suggested that the vessel's helmsman and pilots were operating with different goals. The helmsman was actively steering to maintain a heading of 083 degrees, his last received helm order. Meanwhile, the pilots were trying to make an emergency turn to port, using full ahead thrust, assist tugs, bow thrusters and the port anchor, They unaware that their helmsman was applying starboard rudder to counteract them. Early on Aug 22, the 'Maersk ShekouÄ began heading inbound into Fremantle's harbour and took aboard two pilots. The primary pilot assigned for the transit was fatigued, so the backup pilot took charge during the master/pilot exchange. At about 06.10 a.m., as they entered the narrow entrance channel for the inner port, southwesterly winds picked up to about 40 knots on the starboard quarter. The ship began to swing to starboard. The pilot ordered the helmsman to steer 083; the helmsman correctly acknowledged the order at about 0613:45 a.m. This was the heading that the helmsman would try to maintain throughout the final minutes of the casualty sequence. At the time that the order was given, the helmsman had the rudder hard to port to counteract the effects of the strengthening wind. It wasn't enough to do the job, and the 'Maersk Shekou's heading was about four degrees off to starboard (087). The master suggested going to full ahead to increase steering forces, and at about 0614:34 a.m. the pilot agreed. There was a pier ahead, and they needed to turn to port fast in order to enter the harbor. With more power and a series of assist tug movements, the 'Maersk Shekou' began to swing back to port. As it swung back from 087 through 086, the helmsman moved to check the swing: he brought the helm to midships, then briefly to 33 degrees starboard. The vessel steadied up squarely on 083, the last ordered heading he had received, which was straight towards the pier. The pilot was unsure why the vessel had stopped swinging to port, and at 615:33 a.m. he told the secondary pilot that something was wrong. The secondary pilot had been on a phone conversation at the back of the bridge and had not been involved in the back-and-forth among the bridge team, but he interrupted the call and joined the decisionmaking process. Together, without checking in with the helmsman, they began working the assist tugs to try to turn Maersk Shekou to port. The rudder was amidships at this point, and the helmsman was maintaining a steady heading of 083.5 towards the moored tall ship 'Leeuwin II', now less than a ship length away, with the boxship full ahead and making seven knots. At 0615:54 a.m., the master put the bow thrusters full to port. At 0616:10 a.m., the secondary pilot ordered stop engines, then full astern, and the master ordered the crew to prepare to drop the port anchor. Beginning at 0616:21 a.m., as these emergency measures to turn to port were under way, the helmsman applied more starboard rudder to try to counteract the effort to turn to port. The rudder would be over to starboard as much as 29 degrees over the course of the next minute. At 0616:49 a.m., the engines reached full astern and the 'Maersk Shekou' began to slow. The anchor, tugs and bow thruster managed to start a swing to port, but not fast enough to avert an allision. At about 0618 a.m., the 'Maersk Shekou' hit the 'Leeuwin II' at about three knots. The 'Maersk Shekou' came to a full stop by about 0618:30 a.m., but continued to spin in place. The bow thrusters were still on full to port, and the ship was swinging to port at about 13 degrees per minute. At 0619:52 a.m., the master noted to the pilots that the bow thrusters were still running with full power to port, and the thrusters were shut down,but not quickly enough to prevent contact in the narrow confines of the harbour. 40 seconds later, a stack of containers on the 'Maersk Shekou's starboard quarter hit the roof of the Western Australia Maritime Museum. The ship's hull scraped along the wharf for a short distance, damaging the quayside and breaching a small section of the hull plating above the waterline. The ATSB continues its investigation and will release its full report, including its formal conclusions, when it has completed its review. Interim report: https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-04/MO-2024-001%20Interim%20report.pdf